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Abstract

This paper develops a role for differences in household tastes and
policies that influence household behavior as sources of persistent or
permanent differences between national or regional productivity growth rates,
under perfect international financial capital mobility. We show that when
households are constrained in the trade of some essential input into the
production of nontraded human capital, productivity growth differentials arise
even with common technologies and industrial structures and with constant
returns from scale. We discuss two alternative sources of nontradedness.

One

is that there are essential "home-grown" inputs to human capital augmentation
(represented by time spent in education). The other is that households cannot
borrow against future labor income to finance education and training.

In a

two-country overlapping generations model, we show that intergenerational
redistributions, using either balanced-budget policies or the issuing of
public debt, that reduce private financial saving as conventionally defined
tend to increase human capital formation. We also analyze the effects of
residence-based taxes on savings, subsidies to borrowing for human capital
formation and public provision of inputs into education and training.
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(1) INTRODUCTION.
Much of the rapidly growing literature on endogenous growth has
emphasized increasing returns to scale and/or differences in technology,
factor endowments, initial conditions and industrial structure as explanations
for persistent and permanent differences in productivity growth rates between
nations and regions!.

Where a two-or multi-country approach is adopted, the

richness of the specification of technology and firm behavior stands in stark
contrast to the sparseness of the specification of the household sector, which
seldom ventures beyond the identical representative consumer.
When differences in technology and industrial structure are not present,
as in some of the work of Barro [1989a,b] and in Barro and Sala-i-Martin
[1990b], differences in tastes and in other determinants of household behavior
can yet account for permanent productivity growth differentials, as long as
international or interregional factor mobility is restricted 2 •
The first objective of this paper is to restate and develop the role of
differences in household behavior as a source of persistent and permanent
differences between national or regional productivity growth rates, in a world
with perfect international mobility of financial capital.

We present our

argument about the importance of household tastes and of policies influencing
household behavior when there are constant returns to scale with common
technologies and industrial structures between nations or regions.

We do not

deny that increasing returns or asymmetries in technology and industrial
structure may be an important part of the story of unequal growth and
development.

For expository reasons, however, we abstract from these possible

sources of permanent productivity growth differentials.
Under the assumptions of free international technology transfer, constant
returns to scale, perfect international financial capital mobility and no
non-traded essential growth inputs, most existing growth models (of both the
exogenous and the endogenous variety) would imply global convergence of output
per worker.

Differences in national savings rates would not account for

differences in national rates of accumulation of augmentable factors of
production.

In the simplest version of the model (absent adjustment costs)

convergence would be immediate.
The implication that levels and growth rates of output per worker should
3
be equalized across the globe, is a source of empirical embarrassment • This
remains true even if its sharp edges are dulled somewhat by allowing for
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political and administrative restrictions on the international mobility of
financial capital and for adjustment costs in the accumulation of augmentable
factors of production.

Our approach starts from the recognition that there

are important "local" or national essential complementary inputs into the
production process that cannot be imported but have to be "home-grown".

We

are thinking of the social, political, cultural, legal and educational
infrastructure without which modes of production and economic organization
conducive to high productivity cannot be realized.
In our formal model, we try to capture some of the essence of these
"home-grown" inputs by including in the production function a non-traded
capital good ("human capital") whose production requires a non-traded input
(efficiency units of labor time devoted to education and training) that has an
alternative use in consumption as intrinsically valued leisure.
An alternative (or complementary) derivation of the household decision
rules of our model starts from the assumption that expenditures for education
and training must be self-financed and shows how this requirement can act as a
constraint on national economic growth.

In this approach, the income from

future human capital cannot be used as collateral for borrowing (including
international borrowing) to finance education and training when young.
We realize that our non-traded human capital good whose production
requires a non-traded current input that has alternative uses as a consumption
good, captures but very partially our notion of "home-grown" infrastructure.
Some elements of the home-grown infrastructure (the rule of law, the clear
definition and defense of property rights, the enforcement of contracts and
general popular attitudes towards entrepreneurshi p, business and private
profit) possess aspects of "zero-one" dummy variables (or of variables with a
bounded range of variation) rather than of capital-like augmentable inputs
whose quantity can be varied (given time and effort) without upper bound.
Other "home-grown" inputs such as a skilled and educated labor force fit quite
easily into our formal straight jacket.

It is true that countries can send

their citizens abroad to advance their education and that the processes of
education and training within a country can make use of imported inputs.
This, however, is and has been historically, of second-order importance.
In our formal model, human capital cannot be traded at all.
·however,· is but an analytically convenient simplifying assumption.

This,
Our key

non-convergence result goes through even if human capital can be traded, as
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long as the importable human capital goods are not perfect substitutes for the
domestically produced ones.

Similarly, in the alternative interpretation of

our model, the self-financing constraint on education and training
expenditures can be relaxed without affecting the main qualitative
conclusions, as long as human capital is inferior to physical capital and
financial claims as collateral for borrowing.
The second objective of our paper is the analysis of the role of policies
that affect human capital formation and private financial saving.

Among the

policies we consider are those that effect direct lump-sum intergeneration al
redistribution , either in balanced-budge t fashion or through the issuing of
A two-country OLG model is the natural vehicle for investigating

public debt.
these issues4.

We .show that intergeneration al redistribution policies that

cause "financial crowding out" and reduce conventionally measured private
saving are likely to boost human capital formation.
The conventional system of national income, expenditure and product
accounts fails to register most of a key input into the human capital
formation process: time spent in education and training.

In addition, it

fails to record altogether the output of that process: the increase in the
stock of human capital.

It does register (correctly) as negative household

saving the borrowing by households in order to finance purchases of marketed
inputs into human capital formation.

The purchase of these traded inputs is,

however, erroneously classified as consumption rather than as household
investment.

This has the important implication that it is not necessarily

true that any policy which reduces conventionally measured domestic saving is
growth-unfrien dly.

Even in the real world, loans taken out by younger

households need not be consumption loans, but may instead be used to finance
growth-enhancin g unrecorded human capital formation.
In addition to considering the effects on growth differentials of direct
intergeneration al redistribution, we also consider the effects of
residence-based taxes on savings, of subsidies to borrowing for human capital
formation and of the free provision of public sector inputs into the education
and learning process5.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows.
the model.

Section 2 develops

Section 3 contains the main results concerning the effects of

international differences in household tastes and in budgetary policies on
international productivity growth differentials.

Section 4 addresses in some

4

detail the issue of intergenera tional redistribut ion policies, human capital
formation and financial crowding out.

Section 5 concludes.

(2) THE MODEL.
a. Household behavior.
The decisions concerning consumption , labor supply, human capital
formation and financial portfolio allocation are taken by households.

The

household sector in each country is modeled through a three period overlapping
We only derive the household decision rules for the home

generations model.
country.

The correspondi ng decision rules for the foreign households are

obtained attaching the superscript

to foreign taste parameters and household

The same notational convention will be followed for firms

choice variables.
and governments .

*

While there are many identical consumers in each generation,

we will only use an additional subscript to designate individual consumers
where this is required to avoid ambiguity.
In the first period of her life ('youth'), a consumer born in period t
has an endowment of time,

ho
t

when measured in efficiency units, which she

can either choose to consume as leisure, it in period tor to allocate to an
alternative use, which we shall call education, et

This education process

during the first period of the household's life adds to the endowment of labor
1
during the second period ('middle age'), that is
time in efficiency units h
t"'

during period t+l for a household born in period t.
While young the household can also choose to spend private resources
other than time on human capital formation.
education

Such private spending on

will have to be financed by borrowing, since the household is

born without financial endowment and does not earn any income in the first
period of its life.
household,

Public spending on the education of an individual young

also boosts

h~.

For simplicity the young are assumed not to

pay any taxes or to receive any transfer payments other than the benefits from
the "transfer in kind" gt, which cannot be resold by the recipient.
Endogenous growth is permitted in our model because of two features of
the technology.

First, the production function of traded output is constant

returns to scale in two inputs that can be accumulated , human and physical
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capital.

Second, the production of the two augmentable inputs is itself

subject to constant returns to scale in the traded good and the augmentable
inputs6.
Human capital lives on after death.

Formally we model this by assuming

0

that hjt' the amount of time measured in efficiency units (human capital)
which the j

th

household of generation t i s endowed with at birth, is given by

the average amount of human capital achieved by the previous generation during
middle age, that is, letting Nt denote the number of households-cons umers in
period t,
Nt-1
h 1
~
it-1
N
t-1 i=l

1

Each member of a new generations stands, as regards its starting level of
human capital (knowledge, education), on the shoulders of the average member
of the previous generation.

We also assume, although this is not essential to

obtain endogenous growth, that there is an externality in the human capital
1
0
formation process. From the definition of hjt' it is clear that hjt-l is

non-rival

with respect to the levels of human capital achieved in period t by

members of generation t.

If generation t i s larger, more members of

generation twill benefit from the higher average level of education achieved
by the previous generation.
The externality and source of inefficiency occurs because we also assume
1
2
, is non-excludable. Those in generation t
that the effect of hjt-l on h
it
who benefit from the knowledge accumulated by generation t-1 cannot be made to
pay for these benefits.

By permitting the use of purchased inputs in the

human capital accumulation process, our human capital accumulation mechanism
extends the one developed by Lucas [1988], following Razin [1972] and Ozawa
Azariadis and Drazen [1990] developed a very general specification of
7
the intergeneration al transmission of human capital, which encompasses ours •
[1965].

Borjas (1992] presents empirical evidence for human capital externalities by
showing that the average level of human capital of an individual's ethnic
group for the previous generation positively affects the individual's
productivity level.8
The per capita stock of human capital used in employment by generation t

1
during period t+l, ht' is assumed to be a constant returns to scale function

6

of the current inputs et' mt and gt and the inherited per capita stock of
human capital h~, which equals the per capita level of human capital achieved
by the previous generation h

1
•
t- 1

We believe our assumption of an intergenerational.externality in human
capital accumulation to be realistic.

It also solves the technical problem,

first highlighted by Jones and Manuelli [1990b], of endowing new generations
in an OLG model with an asset whose value will grow at the endogenously
determined growth rate.
During middle age, the only household choice concerns how much to
consume,

1

ct.

The entire endowment of labor time services in efficiency units

h~ is supplied inelastically in the labor market.
'f
l.

Lump-sum taxes (transfers

'd
nega t '1.ve) Ttl are pa1..
In the last period of life ('old age' or 'retirement') households do not

work or educate themselves.

The old consume

c!, which equals the value of

the resources they carried into old age through saving in the first two period
of their lives, minus any lump-sum taxes

r!

paid in their last period.

(t ~ 0) maximizes
1
is lifetime utility function Ut, given in (1) with respect to lt, et' mt' ht'
Formally, each competitive9 household of generation t,

2
1
ct and ct' subject to (2),(3) and (4) and the usual non-negativity
constraints.

(1)
(2)
(3)

lt

= hot

- et

(4)

hl
t

= hot

(1 +

et

¢<a,
ht

1
2
ct, ct' mt ~ O; 0

< lt,

et

mt+gt

--)]
ho
t

< hot .

At the initial date, t

= o,

ho > o.
0

Equation 2 is the lifetime budget constraint of a representative member
of generation t.
t+l.

wt+l is the wage paid per unit of efficiency labor in period

The before-tax interest factor on loans from period t to period t+l is

1 + rt+l·

Otis the period t residence-based tax rate on all non-human asset
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income in the home country.

It is therefore also the subsidy rate to all

domestic borrowing, including borrowing by the young.

We also consider the

subsidizati on of "student loans" (borrowing by the young to finance
expenditure s on traded goods used in human capital formation) as a policy
instrument.

~ is the subsidy rate on these loans.

we·assume that

r!

and

r!

2
1
are such that (2) can be satisfied for non-negativ e values of ct, ct and mt.

¢(.,.), the constant returns to scale production function for the growth
of the household's human capital stock, is positive when both its arguments
assume positive values, has positive but diminishing marginal products to both
inputs and is strictly concave and twice continuousl y differentia ble.
Our assumption of perfect substitutab ility of public and private traded
inputs into the human capital formation process has two virtues. The first is
analytical simplicity. The second is that it avoids an all too easy (and not
very convincing) way of creating a role for government in the human capital
formation process: assuming m and g to be imperfect substitutes 11. Note that
there is no externality in the 1 process: public expenditure on education
th
th
individual: it is
individual can only be enjoyed by the i
benefiting the i
excludable and rival.

It also cannot be resold by the recipient.

Equation (5) gives the intergenera tional transmissio n of human capital.

(5)

h~ = h!_ 1
Population grows at a constant proportiona l rate:

(6)

n > -1; N > 0.
0

The solution to the household optimizatio n problem is given by equations

Equation (7) is the familiar martingale condition for the discounted
marginal utility of consumption . Equation (8) equates the marginal utility of
leisure in period t to the discounted marginal utility of the extra
consumption permitted in period t+l by allocating an additional unit of time

8

Equation (9) equates the marginal cost of borrowing

to education in period t.

to finance additional traded inputs into the education process to the value of
the marginal product of the traded education input.
involve the utility function of the household.

Note that (9) does not

Borrowing to finance the

purchase of additional traded inputs into the education process can be decided
by the household as if it were a profit maximizing firm, that is with
reference to the productive efficiency criterion alone.
With perfect international integration of financial markets, the use of
traded productive inputs alone will therefore not result in taste differences
generating permanent differences in human capital accumulation rates and in
productivity growth rates.

It is equation (8) that accounts for the

dependence of the optimal value of the non-traded human capital accumulation
input on the parameters of the utility function and thus for the possibility
of permanent productivity growth differentials.
The household decision rules for the foreign country are completely
analogous to those for the home country and will not be reproduced here.
Parameters, variables and functions with the superscript
the foreign country.

*

will characterize

Note that while all taste and policy parameters can

differ between the two countries, the human capital accumulation technology

(~, a, p

and

0)

is the same in both countries.

Self-financing.vs. non-tradedness.
The essential implications of this paper do not depend on the specific
details of the human capital accumulation mechanism we assume, which relies
heavily on education-leisure choice.

An alternative (or complementary)

mechanism giving rise to the same qualitative conclusions is based on
plausible constraints on households' abilities to borrow against labor
earnings to finance educational expenditures.

For simplicity, assume that the

young can allocate their endowment of efficiency time h~ either to leisure,
lt' or to work.

To make the point as clearly as possible, the role of

non-traded education in human capital accumulation is omitted.

Only private

traded inputs and public traded inputs enter in the human capital formation
process, as given in (10).
m +g

(10)

h! = h~[l +

l<

t 0t)J
ht

9

The proportional growth function t i s positive when its argument is
positive,increa sing, strictly concave and twice continuously differentiable.
The key capital market imperfection in this alternative model is that
private traded inputs in human capital formation can be financed only out of
concurrent labor income.

Borrowing against expected future labor income in
The belief that capital

order to finance the purchase of mt is not permitted.

market imperfections constrain human capital accumulation by households is
12
widespread and supported by empirical studies of educational attainment •
Becker [1975) discusses borrowing constraints in theoretical models of human
capital accumulation at length.

Barro, Mankiw and Sala i Martin [1992] also

discuss the importance of self-financing constraints for convergence of growth
rates under international capital mobility.
This gives us the following self-financing constraint
(11)

0

mt~ wt(ht - it)

The revised household budget constraint for this model is
(12)

(l+rt+l-Ot+l)[( h~ - lt)wt - mt)+ h!wt+l - c! -

O

(l+rt+2- t+2)

r!
-l

2

(ct+

r t2 )

) 0
-

The competitive household maximizes (1) subject to (10), (11) and (12).
When the self-financing constraint (11) is not binding, the first-order
conditions of the household are:
(13)

u'(c!) = (1 + rt+ 2 - 0t+ 2 )Pu'(c!)

(14)
(15)

It is apparent from equation (15) that, when the self-financing
constraint for human capital formation is not binding, the household's optimal
choice of mt is, for given values of the interest rate and the wage rate,
independent of taste parameters (time preference,- intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, labor-leisure choice).

With perfect international capital

mobility equalizing interest rates and wage rates world-wide (ignoring
distortionary taxes), international differences in the growth rates of human
capital can therefore not be attributed to international differences in
household preferences or to international differences in policies influencing

10

saving or labor-leisure choice.
When the self-financing constraint (11) binds, the return to financial
saving in the first period of life (l+rt+l-Ot+l) is less than the return to
investing in human capital (!'wt+l).

The first-order conditions of the

household are given by (13) and
(16)

mt= wt(h~ - it)

(17)

The utility-of-leisure cost of increasing mt (on the left-hand-side of
(17)) is equated to the additional utility of consumption in period t+l
permitted by the rise in h~ caused by the increase in mt (on the
right-hand-side of (17)).

The growth rate of human capital will therefore be

a function of the parameters characterizing household preferences.
Comparing equations (8) and (9) with equations (16) and (17), the
qualitative properties of our model will be the same when we assign a key role
to the non-tradedness of an essential growth input, as when we invoke a
binding self-financing constraint for a traded growth input (one difference is
noted later).

In the version of the self-financing constraint presented here,

it is labor-leisure choice rather than education-leisure choice that causes
the growth rate of human capital to depend on household preferences and on
policies affecting household behavior.

Both mechanisms may well be operative

in practice.
If the model is generalized slightly by permitting the household to
consume traded goods when young, a binding self-financing constraint on the
sum of consumption when young and educational expenditures causes the growth
rate of human capital to depend on the time preference rate and other
characteristics of household preferences, even if labor supply is exogenous.
For expositional simplicity we restrict our formal analysis in what follows to
the case of the essential non-traded growth input.

b. Firm behavior.
Firms face competitive output and input markets and maximize profits.
Non-negative quantities of the two factors of production, human capital (or
efficiency units of labor) and physical capital, can be varied costlessly.
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All firms are identical.

The representat ive firm's production function is

linear homogeneous in the two factors of production, increasing in both its
arguments, strictly concave, twice continuousl y differentia ble and satisfies
the Inada conditions.

Capital depreciatio n is ignored.

The aggregate production function for the home country is given in
It exhibits constant returns to scale in the two inputs, human

equation (18).

and physical capital, is increasing, strictly concave and satisfies the Inada
The representat ive domestic firm's first-order conditions

conditions.

equating the real interest rate to the marginal product of capital and the
real wage to the marginal product of efficiency labor are given are given in
equations (19) and (20) respectivel y.

Y denotes aggregate output, K the

aggregate physical capital stock, H the aggregate stock of human capital and

k

= K/H.

(18)

yt = Htf(kt)

( 19)

rt

(20)

wt= f(kt) - ktf'(kt) = W(kt)'

=

f' (kt)

> 0.
W' = -kt f''(k)
t

The derivation of foreign country output, interest rate and wage rate is
analogous.

Note that the two countries also have identical production
At the initial date, t

technologie s for traded output f(.).

= O, K + K* > O.
0
0

c. Government.
In both countries the government spends on the education of its young,
levies lump-sum taxes on the middle aged and the old, taxes all asset income
of its residents at a proportiona l rate

0,

subsidizes education loans at a

proportion rate~, pays interest on its debt and borrows to finance any excess
of current outlays over current revenues.
debt denominated in the traded output.
government debt outstanding is Bt.

Government debt is single-peri od

The outstanding stock of home country

The home country government single-peri od

budget identity is given in equation (21).

The conventiona l solvency

constraints , given in (22a) is assumed to apply13.

The foreign country

counterpart s are obvious and have been omitted.
2
1
8 t+l = ( 1 + rt)Bt + gt Nt - r t-1 Nt-1 - r t-2 Nt-2
( 21 )

12

- 0 {[
t

2

+ T2
t-2 ]N
t-2
t-2
1 + r - 0
t
t

+ r

lim

(22a)

C

T--!cD

B

0

t+i

)

-1

= 0
B
t+l+T

and B * are given.
0

The budget identity and the solvency constraint of the home government
together imply the present value budget constraint given in (22b).
2
2
• 2
• 2 + T
C
2
1
[
[Il
t+it+i+ 0
N ,
•
+ T t+i-2
. N .
A . rt+i-1
=
]Nt+i-2
t+i[
t+i-2
t+i-1
t+i
1+rt+i- 8t+i

6

-

8
< t+i + ft+i)mt+i-lNt+ i-1 - 9 t+iNt+~

i
At+i - Ilc1+rt+j>-1
j=O
This says that the outstanding value of the public debt should be equal
to the present discounted value of the future primary (non-interest) public
sector budget surpluses.
For future use, we introduce the following notation:
2

Tt
(23)

-T

t

is the present value (discounted to period t+l) of the net lifetime

lump-sum fiscal transfer to a member of generation t.

Note that

(l+rt+l-Ot+l-~ t+l)gt, the period t+l value of the public educational inputs
spent on a member of generation t, can be viewed as income-in-kind , it is not
a lump-sum transfer.

d. Market equilibrium.
There is perfect international mobility of financial capital.

In the

absence of distortionary source-based taxes on capital income, the domestic
and foreign before-tax interest rates and rates of return on fixed capital
will be equalized.

(24)
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The after-tax rates of return to private saving, 1 + rt country and 1 + rt -

Ot in the home

0t* in the foreign country, however, can differ.

From the production function, equalization of capital-human capital
ratios in the two economies implies that the wage rates (of efficiency labor)
in the two countries are also equalized, although labor itself is not traded
internationally and workers are not internationally mobile.
(25)

The fact that both countries' labor markets clear each period means that
1
(26a)
Ht= ht-lNt-1

*

*l

*

(26b)

Ht= ht-lNt-1
Home country private financial wealth at the beginning of period t+l,

At+l' is given by (27a).

Ft+l denotes the net foreign assets of the home

country at the beginning of period t+l.
1
1
1
C
(27a)
rt-1
At+l - (wtht-1
t-1
(27b)

Ft+l

-

At+l

-

Note that F = - F * .

-

(1 + rt

-

ot

~t)mt-l]Nt-1 - mtNt

Kt+l - 8 t+l

The old (those born in period t-2) will not be holding any assets: they
have at the end of period t

just exhausted the last of their lifetime savings.

The savings of the middle aged (those born in period t-1) will be the sum of
their primary (non-interest) current surpluses during middle age (wth~-l c~-l -

r~-l

per person of generation t-1) and their compounded primary current

surpluses from their youth (- (1 + rt -

0t -

~ )m

t

t- 1

per member of generation

The young at the end of period twill have negative per capita savings

t-1).

equal to -mt' the value of their borrowing to finance their education (student
loans).
The condition for equilibrium in the world capital market is given in
equation (30), where equalization of domestic and foreign interest rates and
wage rates has already been imposed.
(28)

*

*

*

Kt+l + Kt+l + 8 t+l + 8 t+l = At+l + At+l
Equation (28) states that the total stock of non-human assets at the

*
*
beginning of period t+l, Kt+l + Kt+l + Bt+l + Bt+l, has to be willingly held
by the private sectors of the two countries.
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We define b _ B/H, b * - B* /H * and

fJ t*

is a measure of

Equation (28) can now be rewritten

the relative size of the foreign country.
as:
(29)

We note that there are two different kinds of steady state solutions. In
the first, the long run growth rate of aggregate human capital differs between
the two countries.

This implies that the relative size of the country with
In the second the long run growth

the lower growth rate decreases steadily.
rates are the same.

In this case, a steady state can exist in which

fJ

* is

positive and finite.

(3) INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH DIFFERENTIALS.

With perfect financial capital mobility leading to equalization of
physical capital intensities and of wage rates per unit of efficiency labor,
it is easily seen that international differences in the growth rate of output
per worker are due solely to differences in the growth rate of human capital
1

Noting that Yt = Htf(kt) = ht-lNt_ 1 f(kt)'

per worker.

output per worker Il in

the home country is given by
Ilt

= Yt/Nt-1

1
= ht-lf(kt)

The rate of growth of home country output per worker, \Tis given by

IT

\T

t

t+l
=n----1
t

Similarly, with a common technology and free capital mobility, we have for the
foreign country:

n*t *
\ft

=

n*t+l
- -n*t

1.
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It follows that the differences in the growth rate.of output per worker are
given by:
(30)

In steady state 14, the labor productivity growth differential is given
by:
'K -

*
'K

hl
t
=
1
ht-1

*1
ht
*1
ht-1

Equations (4) and (30) imply that the productivity growth differential is
given by

(33)

When the constraint mt~ 0 is not binding, the optimal program of the
home country generation t household and the factor market equilibrium
conditions yield equations (34) through to (37).

1

These can be solved for ct,

c!, et and mt as functions of kt+l' kt+ 2 , h~_ 1 , the home country fiscal policy
2
1
parameters Ot+l' 0t+ 2 , ~t+l' rt, rt and gt and the home country subjective
discount factor

p

15

(34)
(35)

(36)

(37)

A set of four equations analogous to (34) through to (37) can be derived
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*
*
2*
l*
for the foreign country, allowing us to solve for c t , c t , et and mt as
l*
*
functions of kt+l' kt+ 2 , ht-l' the foreign fiscal policy parameters Ot+l'
2*
l*
*
*
subjective discount factor p*.
t+2' ~t+l' Tt, Tt and gt and the foreign

o*

If

we restrict ourselves to the analysis of small perturbatio ns away from

symmetric

equilibria (that is, equilibria characteriz ed by identical values of

all parameters and identical initial conditions across the two countries), the
effect on the productivit y growth differentia l of small differences in these
parameters can be analyzed without having to consider the effect of the
perturbatio ns on kt+l and kt+ 2 •

We impose this restriction in what follows.

The effect of changes in taste and policy parameters and in initial conditions
on the internation al productivit y growth

differentia l

can then be found by

considering the effect on the domestic productivit y growth

level

of changes in

domestic taste and policy parameters and in domestic initial conditions, at
These effects are found from total

given values of kt+l and kt+ 2 •

differentia tion of equations (34)-(37).

The appendix provides the resulting

set of equations simplified to allow straightforw ard derivation of the effects
reported below.

We know what happens to domestic productivit y growth when we

know what happens to et and to mt+gt.

To conserve space, we only report the

results for the case where the constraint mt~ 0 is binding when the effects
of variations in gt are discussed.

A reduction in the time preference rate.

The signs of the effects of an increase in fJ are the following:
1
*
de!
dct
d('ft-'ft)
det
dmt
>
ambiguous
is
a
>
> a
a

arr

arr>

The intuition is clear.

arr

d(J

arr

a

.

Reduced impatience lowers the demand for early

consumption of leisure, lt, and therefore increases the amount of time spent
in education while young, et.
growth function are complements
also increases.

Since the two inputs in the human capital

(¢12

> 0), the use of the traded input, mt,

The productivit y growth differentia l therefore moves in favor

of the country with the lower rate of time preference.

A higher value of

fJ

also increases the demand for consumption when old, c!, while the effect on
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1

consumption when middle-aged, ct' is ambiguous.
Note that with borrowing by the young to finance the purchase of traded
inputs into the human capital accumulation process, the effect of a lower rate
of time preference on home country relative private financial wealth is
ambiguous.

This is true even if there is no government debt and the

government budget is balanced continuously.

While a higher value of

fi

will

cause the middle-aged to save more, it will also cause the young to dissave
more by taking out more "student loans" (mt increases).

Since the increased

value of the human capital assets acquired by the young is not counted in
conventionally measured saving, the net effect of an increase in

fi

on

conventionally measured private financial wealth is ambiguous.

An increase in the present value of life-time lump-sum taxes.
Note that an increase in lump-sum taxes paid when middle-aged had the
same effects as an increase in the discounted lump-sum taxes paid when old.
1
0
-1 2
We therefore only discuss the impact of changes in Tt= rt+ (l+rt+ - t+ > rt,
2
2
which are as follows:

Any change in the government's policy concerning borrowing and lump-sum
taxes and transfers that increases the net life-time lump-sum tax burden on
generation t, will reduce human capital formation by that generation.

The

negative effect of an increase in Tt on life-time income will reduce
consumption of leisure while young and consumption of traded goods during
middle age and old age.

The increase in et induces (because e and mare

complementary inputs, ¢
> 0) an increase in mt.
12

Human capital formation and

productivity growth in the home country are boosted relative to their foreign
counterparts.

Higher public spending on the traded human capital accumulation input.
When the constraint mt> 0 is not binding, the effects of an increase in
public education expenditure are the following:

18

> 0

> 0 •

As long as the non-negativity constraint on private spending on education
is not binding, an increase in gt' public spending on ~ducation will lead to a

reduction

in mt+gt, the total amount spent on education by the private and

public sectors combined.

Time spent on education, et'

will also be reduced

and the relative growth rate of home country human capital will decline
Consumption when middle-aged and when old increase, despite
1
the reduction in ht' because of the smaller amount of educational debt carried

unambiguously.

into middle age.
As a profit maximizing

firm

facing a given wage and interest rate, the

young worker would respond to the in-kind free gift of gt by reducing his
private input of mt one for one.

The free gift of gt' however, also has an

income effect on the young worker as a consumer the same as would a decrease
in T

t

by (l+r

t+l

-0t+l -mYt+l )

g

t·

The net result is the more than 100 percent

crowding out of private education spending by public spending on education.
If the increase in public spending on the education of a member of
generation t, gt' is matched by a corresponding increase in the present
discounted value of the life-time lump-sum taxes paid by generation t, Tt' so
as to be distributionally neutral between generations there is no income
effect associated with the increase in public spending on education, and the
"direct crowding out" (Suiter [1977)) of private by public spending is exactly
one-for-one.
If an aim of policy is to boost human capital formation, this model
suggests that increasing public spending on education while the private sector
still engages in private spending on education, would not be very effective.
An obviously superior policy is one pursued (up to a point) by most
governments: the removal of the education decision from the realm of private
decision making.

Compulsory school attendance up to a certain age is indeed

the rule in most societies.

It can be checked easily that with administrative

assignment of e and of g and access to non-distortionary taxes,
Pareto-efficient equilibria can be supported 1 6.
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When the mt~ O constraint is binding, the effect of an increase in
public spending on education, gt' on private time spent on education is
ambiguous.

The increase in the quantity of the complementary factor of

production gt raises the marginal return to another hour spent in education.
The income effect, however, goes the other way and suggests an increase in the
demand for leisure.

Even when et declines, however, the net effect on the

growth rate of human capital is positive.

The intuition for this is that the

positive income effect of the increase in public spending also raises the
1
2
1
demand for ct and ct. The net effect of an increase in gt on ht and on the
home country productivity growth rate is therefore positive when the
non-negativity constraint on mt is binding.
The two alternative household models differ with respect to the effects
of an increase in public spending on private educational inputs.

In the

version in which the household cannot borrow against future labor income to
finance its educational expenditures, an increase in gt also raises demand for
leisure when young and demand for consumption during middle age and old age.
When the self-financing constraint (11) is binding, this leads to a net
increase in the household's investment in human capital.

This happens because

an increase in gt and an equal discounted present value increase in Tt are not
equivalent when the constraint on household borrowing while young remains
binding.

In that case, raising consumption while middle aged and old requires

a rise in the household's accumulation of human capital.

If the constraint

does not bind, then an increase in gt and equal value increase in Tt have the
same effect (however, crowding out is one-for-one if kt+l and kt+ 2 are
constant in that case).

An increase in the student loan subsidy rate.
The analysis of the effects of a change in~

t+ 1

, the subsidy rate on

student loans taken out in period t, is straightforward.

Note that the effect

on generation t of a change in ~t+l is the same as the effect on generation t
of a change in 0t+l' the general subsidy to borrowing (tax on lending)
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undertaken in period t.

In addition, a change in

Ot+ l

will affect the

marginal cost of borrowing or lending in period t by generation t-1.
consider this below, when we report the effects of a change in 0t+

2

We
on

generation t.
An increase in ~t+l or Ot+l reduces the marginal cost of borrowing to
finance the purchase of traded inputs in the accumulation of human capital.
The substitution effect of an increase in the subsidy rate on student loans
1
2
works to increase mt et, ct and ct. When mt is positive, the positive income
effect of an increase in~

1

2

as regards ct and ct.

t+

l or

Ot+l

will reinforce the substitution effects

Since leisure is a normal good, however, the income

effect will tend to reduce et.

If the net effect on et is negative, it is

possible, since et and mt are complementary inputs, that mt also declines,
despite the reduction in the marginal cost of borrowing.

The household as

consumer of leisure overwhelms the household as producer in this case.

If

both mt and et fall, the home country productivity growth rate declines.

Even

in this case, the total amount of resources carried into middle age will be
larger as a result of the increase in ~t+l or Ot+l' because of the increased
subsidy.

If income effects are small, the productivity growth differential

will increase.
If we compensate for the increased educational subsidy with an increase
of equal value in Tt (the present discounted value of life-time lump-sum taxes
paid by generation t) in a way that is distributionally neutral between
generations, only the marginal incentive effects will be present and mt, et

*
and ~t - ~twill
increase unambiguously.

An increase in the tax on saving during middle age.
The effects of an increase in

Ot+2

by one unit on the behavior of

generation tare the same as the effects of an increase in Tt of magnitude

,..

T

t+2

+ c

t+2

2
2
+ u'(c )/u"(c)
t
t
2

( l+rt+2-0t+2)
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which has an ambiguous sign.

This is the sum of a real income effect from the

reduction in the marginal return to saving during middle age (changing the
present value of ct+ +rt+ ) and an intertemporal substitution effect.
If
2
2
2 2 is
. positive,
. .
.
. 0t+ represents a lo~s of rea 1 income. This
ct+rt
an increase
in
2

2

at least partially offset by the negative substitution effect on ct.

Ot+ 2

zero, then the signs of the effects of an increase in

2

If rt is

on the choices of

generation t depend on whether the equilibrium intertemporal elasticity of
substitution is greater than, equal to or less than unity.
If we compensate for the increased tax on saving by the middle-aged (that
is, for the real income effect of 0t+

2

only) with a reduction of equal value

in lump-sum taxes, Tt, in a way that is distributionally neutral between
generations, then the only effects of an increase in
incentive effects for generations t and t+l.

Ot+ 2

are the marginal

The substitution effect for

generation t works to reduce investment in human capital while the
substitution effect for generation t+l works in the opposite direction, so
that the net impact on productivity growth rate differentials is ambiguous.
We can, however, reduce life-time lump-sum taxes for generation t by -Tt to
compensate for the entire effect of an increase in

Ot+ 2

on that generation (as

part of a distributionally neutral policy), so that the net effect on home
country productivity growth relative to foreign productivity growth is just
the positive substitution effect for generation t+l. 17

Steady-state productivity growth differentials.
When the preference ordering generating Ut in equation (1) is
homothetic 18 , the steady state version of equations (34) to (37) can be
written as in equations (38) to (41).
1 1
2
(38)
u'(c /h ) = (l+f'(k)-0)/Ju'(c /h: )
-1
1
~
e
m+g
1 1
(39)
v'(l-(e/h: >) = /J u'(c /h_l)W(k)r1<-1-, - )
1
h_l h:1

(40)
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(41)

For a steady state to exist, each exogenous flow variable must be
constant when expressed as a fraction of human capital per member of the young
2
1
generation, that is, g/h: 1 , r /h: 1 and r /h: 1 must be constant. Equations
1
(38) to (41) then determine the steady-stat e values of m/h_ 1 ,
2 1
and c /h_

1

as f unct'i ons o f {J ,

O,

2
1 1
1
_ and k •
~, g /h_ , r /h _ , r /hl
1
1
1

set of equations applies to the foreign country.
again to perturbatio ns of a

symmetric

An analogous

If we restrict ourselves

stationary equilibrium (identical values

of all parameters in the two countries), we can analyze the effects of changes
in taste and policy parameters without having to work out the effect of these
parameter changes on the steady-stat e ratio of physical to human capital, k.
2 1
1 1
1
Furthermore , the steady state effects of {J , 0, ~, g/h_ 1 , r /h_ 1 and r /h_ 1 on
2 1
1 1
1
1
m/h_ , e/h_ , c /h_ and c /h_ 1 (and therefore on the steady state
1
1
1
productivit y growth differentia l), are exactly the same as the impact effects
,
,
1
,
2
1
2
1
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, ~t' gt, rt and rt on mt, et, ct and ct, given ht-l' derived in the
o f {J , Ot
previous subsections .

Only traded inputs into human capital accumulatio n.
Inter-count ry differences in productivit y growth rates disappear in our
model when all inputs into human capital accumulatio n are tradable.

This

effectively is the case analyzed in Alogoskoufi s and van der Ploeg [1991].
Consider, for example, the following human capital accumulatio n function in
which only traded inputs enter:
o A
o
1
ht= ht{l + n[(mt + gt)/ht] }

O<A<l.

With this strictly concave accumulatio n function the first order
condition for mt becomes, when the non-negativ ity constraint on mt is not
binding

With perfect internation al mobility of financial capital and no
differentia l source-base d taxes on capital rentals, the before-tax interest
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rate will be equalized in the world economy.

With a common production

function the wage rate (per unit of efficiency labor) will also be equalized
throughout the world economy.

With a common human capital accumulation

technology (common values of~ and

A

in this example) and common distortionary

tax rates, the equilibrium value of (mt+ gt)/h~ is equalized throughout the
world economy.

Taste parameters (such as

P and

therefore no longer matter

Neither do redistributive

for differences in productivity growth rates.
lump-sum taxation or public sector deficits.

P)*

The only aspect of fiscal policy

in our model that matters for growth differentials are the tax rates on
non-human asset income and student loan subsidy rates

*
(8, 8,

*
~and~).

Different source-based capital rental tax rates would cet. par. cause
different wages to be generated in the parts of the world where they apply.
By raising the return to human capital accumulation a higher home country
relative real wage would cet. par. increase mt and thus the relative growth
rate of home country human capital.
Note that a permanently higher value of~ will

cet. par.

be associated

with a permanently higher home country relative growth rate of human capital
and a permanently higher relative rate of growth of output per worker.
increase in

8

An

will have the same effects.

Also, higher public spending on education would

cet. par.

(i.e. without

allowing for possible consequences for the world rate of interest and the wage
rate of the financing decisions associated with higher public spending) crowd
out private spending on education one-for-one: d(mt +gt)= 020.

If m and g

were imperfect substitutes, crowding out would be less than one-for-one.
If the non-negativity constraint mt~ 0 on private expenditure on
education is binding, the government can of course boost the growth rate of
human capital simply by raising gt, its own expenditure on education.

(4)

GOVERNMENT BORROWING AND LUMP-SUM INTERGENERATIONAL REDISTRIBUTION: MUST

WHAT HELPS SAVING HURT HUMAN CAPITAL FORMATION?
The discussion of the effect on human capital formation of changes in Tt,
the present discounted value of life-time lump-sum taxes paid by generation t
raises a number of important policy issues.

We saw that an increase in Tt
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...raises human capital .formation by generation t.

The mechanism is either the

income effect on time spent in education while young or (in our alternative
model) the income effect on work performed while young in order to relax a
binding self-financing constraint on human capital formation.
One obvious question is whether it is possible to alter Tt systematically
in the same direction for a (long) sequence of generations, so as to have a
systematic and lasting influence on the rate of human capital formation
The answer will turn out

through lump-sum intergenerational redistribution.
to be affirmative, even in steady state.

It is possible even when the

government is restricted to balanced-budget strategies.
A second question is whether in our model, intergenerational
redistribution policies that boost human capital formation are necessarily
also policies that hurt national saving (and thus, in a closed economy,
physical capital formation).

Consider home country financial wealth (private

plus public) at the beginning of period t+l.

2

2

ct-1 + 7 t-1
-8 ]Nt-1-mtNt-8 t+l
At+l - 8 t+l = [l+r
t+l t+l

<42 >

=

0
1
1
1
[wtht-1-ct-1- 7 t-1-(l+rt- t-~t)mt-l]Nt-1-mtNt- 8 t+l

It is clear that any policy that increases Tt will, by boosting borrowing
to finance the purchase of traded inputs into human capital formation, mt'
reduce financial saving in period t by the young.

Unless it increases

financial saving by the middle aged in period t o r by the government,
conventionally measured national saving falls in period t as a result of the
credible announcement of the same fiscal action that increases human capital
formation.
Even if conventionally defined national financial saving declines, there
is no necessary policy dilemma.

The reason is that the conventional national

income accounts do not record and value much of the time spent in education
and training.

The savings data correctly record borrowing in order to finance

the purchase of marketed educational inputs as dissaving, but fail to register
the associated acquisition of intermediate inputs by the household sector as a
form of investment.
consumption loans.

Such loans are therefore by default classified as
Thus the current resources devoted to human capital

formation are either not recorded at all (in the case of et) or recorded as
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consumption (in the case of mt).
It is easily seen that balanced-budge t intergeneration al redistribution
can increase the present discounted value of life-time lump-sum taxes for all
generations. Consider, for instance, a permanent balanced-budge t tax increase
imposed on the middle-aged with the proceeds used to finance a tax cut for the
old, that is, a permanent increase in the scale of an unfunded social security
retirement scheme.2 1

For simplicity let the stock of public debt Bt equal

zero for all t, and let all distortionary tax rates be zero as well.

During

middle age each person pays a tax increase worthµ and during old age she
receives a tax reduction worth (1 + n)µ. That is:
-1 2
1
. 1 = µ > 0 for all i ~ -2.
drt +i. = -(1 + n) drt +ion generation t+i

80;0::::::m:,t::• i::::::: rate

chang::eb:r:s[e ::+:::c~u:]te:h: ::u:
1 + rt +2 +i.

rate of growth of population, as we shall assume 22 •

exceeds the

With leisure a normal

good, this policy therefore increases forever more the home country allocation
of time to education and thus the rate of growth of the stock of human capital
relative to that in the rest of the world.
This example also illustrates the point that intergeneration al
redistribution that favors human capital formation will tend to reduce
. conventionally measured financial saving (and vice-versa). As noted before,
the increase in Tt (for all tin our example) will increase mt together with
et.

This increase in financial dissaving by the young is reinforced by a

reduction in saving by the middle-aged, for familiar life-cycle reasons.

The

increase in the scale of the home-country unfunded social security retirement
scheme reduces saving by the middle aged and therefore reduces further the
total national stock of non-human assets held by domestic residents23.
Next consider an example with an unbalanced government budget, in which
intergeneration al redistribution favors financial· saving but hurts human
capital formation. In period tan (unexpected) one-time tax is levied on the
old.

The revenues from this one-time wealth levy, fit' are used to retire

public debt.

Following the wealth levy, the present discounted value of net

future tax receipts is therefore reduced by fit.

This "present value tax

26

dividend" can be distributed across generations in such a manner that the
present discounted value of lifetime taxes for all current and future
generations (except the unfortunate current old) is lower.

For instance, one

could give the middle-aged each period, beginning in period t, the same size
tax cut, with the value of the per capita tax cut determined by the
requirement that its present discounted value be equal to fit.
This policy would clearly raise the permanent income (at given wages and
interest rates) of all generations born in period t-1 or later.

It would

therefore reduce the expenditure of time and traded goods on human capital
formation (and the associated borrowing) during youth by all generations born
in period t o r later ••

Current and future middle-aged all increase their

saving for life-cycle purposes.

Again, human capital formation and financial

saving move in opposite directions.
These two examples make it clear that the proposition, that any
intergenerational redistribution policy that raises Tt for all twill have a
positive effect on human capital formation and a negative effect on
conventionally measured financial saving, is perfectly general when the
interest rate exceeds the growth rate of population.

Without much loss of

generality, consider balanced-budget redistribution policies only 24 •

The

lower permanent income represented by the increase in Tt increases human
capital formation while young and reduces consumption while old.

Increased

human capital formation implies increased dissaving (borrowing) by the young.
A lower value of c! is only consistent with
during middle age, if

r!

increased

saving by generation t

increases by more than c! falls.

In fact,
2

balanced-budget redistribution that increases Tt requires rt to fall if the
interest rate in period t exceeds the population growth rate, that is, the
redistribution scheme has to be from the middle aged (T~ increases) to the old
2

(Tt decreases).
How worried should policy authorities interested in boosting economic
growth be, in our model, about the reduction in private saving associated with
an increase in Tt?

Clearly, to the extent that the reduction in private

saving represents a reduction in saving by the middle-aged, it is at the
expense of the growth of national non-human wealth (at the expense of fixed
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~apital formation in a closed economy) without any compensatin g increase in
human wealth. If the reduction in conventiona lly measured financial saving is
instead due to increased dissaving by the young, there is a matching
unrecorded increase in the value of human capital. Depending on whose private
saving is reduced and on the relative social yields on human and non-human
assets, the financial crowding out of private saving by public borrowing (or
by policies with equivalent intergenera tional redistribut ion effects) may be
growth-prom oting rather than growth-inhi biting.

(5)

CONCLUSION.

The literature on endogenous growth models has emphasized economies of
scale, differences in technology and in industrial structure, and barriers to
trade in factors and/or commodities as sources of persistent and permanent
internation al productivit y growth rate differentia ls. In a fully integrated
global economy with free technology transfer and financial capital mobility,
constant returns to scale implies global convergence of the level and growth
rate of output per worker despite differences in national savings rates.
paper offers a complementa ry (and non-rival) approach to those discussed

Our

elsewhere for differences in household characteris tics and in fiscal policies
affecting household behavior to lead to permanent internation al productivit y
growth rate differentia ls.
Non-tradedn ess of an essential growth input or the presence of a binding
self-financ ing constraint on expenditure s for education and training suffice
to create a role for differences in household behavior (and thus for policies
influencing household behavior) as sources of persistent and even permanent
internation al differences in productivit y growth rates. This holds even
though there is perfect internation al mobility of financia125 and physical
capital and even though industrial structure and technology are identical
across the world and returns to scale are constant.
In our model, a higher rate of time preference will lower a country's
relative rate of growth by reducing its rate of accumulatio n of human capital.
A higher public debt burden will, to the extent that it represents a net

intergenera tional redistribut ion towards the old, increase a country's growth
rate of human capital and output relative to the rest of the world. More
generally, deficit financing policies and lump-sum intergenera tional
redistribut ion policies that boost conventiona lly measured financial saving
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will reduce human capital accumulation.

The level of the growth rate of the

country that raises its public debt burden could of course decline, since a
higher public debt burden also lowers financial saving and physical capital
formation.
Since human capital accumulation involves positive external effects,
Pareto-efficiency requires subsidies to education or, in our model, a tax on
leisure or a wage subsidy.

The same result can of course also be achieved

through administrative assignment of time and resources spent on schooling,
overriding individual choice.

Improvements over the unassisted decentralized

equilibrium that fall short of full Pareto efficiency can be achieved by
subsidizing private borrowing for educational expenditure (student loans).
In our model with an essential non-traded input in education, when public
spending on education is equally efficient as private spending, an increase in
.public spending on education will crowd out private spending more than
one-for-one, because this public transfer in kind is equivalent to an increase
in the life-time lump-sum transfer received by each generation receiving it.
In the alternative model with a binding self-financing constraint on education
expenditures, an increase in public spending on education and an equal present
value increase in life-time lump-sum transfers are not equivalent since the
household is unable to borrow against future resources to finance current
expenditures while young.

If the household's borrowing constraint remains

binding, then public spending for education raises the growth rate.
A distributionally neutral increase in the subsidy rate to student loans

and increase in lump-sum taxes will raise the relative growth rate of
productivity.

A

distributionally neutral increase in a general

residence-based tax on lending (subsidy to borrowing) has the same effect.
The effects of a residence-based tax increase on the middle-aged can be fully
offset by a suitable change in the net lump-sum transfer to this generation.

29

APPENDIX
This appendix provides the information necessary to derive the effects of
1

taste and policy parameter perturbations on household choices of et, mt, ct
2

Totally differentiating ~quations (34) - (37)

and ct reported in the text.

and substituting out the result for (34) to eliminate de! yields the following
equation system:

1
-(v" cl t )+w¢ 11/3u" cc t
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It is straightforward to
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FOOTNOTES

1 see e.g. Romer [1986, 1987, 1989, 1990a,b,c], Lucas (1988], Grossman and
Helpman [1989a,b,c,d; 1990; 1991], Young (1989], Azariadis and Drazen [1990],
Feenstra [1990] and Quah and Rauch (1990].

2 In the macroeconomic literature Lucas [1988, pp.14-17] recognizes and
emphasizes the importance of factor mobility assumptions for the predictions
It is equally important for endogenous growth
of nee-classical growth theory.
theory with constant returns (of which our paper is an example) and for
endogenous growth theory with increasing returns.
3 Recent examples of studies that investigate national differences in per
capita output levels and growth rates using as (one of) the technological
maintained hypotheses the constant or decreasing returns to augmentable
factors of production model and the common global technology of production
include the empirical studies of Barro [1989a,b], King and Rebelo [1989],
For more on the facts on
Benhabib and Jovanovic (1989] and Cohen [1990].
'. convergence see Baumol (1986] and Baumol, Blackman and Wolff [1987]. Easterly
[1989] has a technology that can exhibit increasing returns to scale but
focuses on the case of constant returns to reproducible factors and either a
constant value for the irreproducible factor or independence of output from
In Easterly [1990] the model is
the irreproducible factor in steady state.
simplified to exhibit constant returns to reproducible factors.
Irreproducible factors play no role. Finally, Edwards [1989] develops and
tests a simple model of growth in developing countries in which the assumption
It is replaced by one
of access to a common global technology is abandoned.
to the higher
nation
backward
technologically
a
by
up
of gradual catching
up is
catches
country
a
which
at
rate
The
technology.
of
level
external
orientation
external
of
degree
the
of
function
increasing
an
be
postulated to
in the country's international trade relations.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin [1990b] use a model without factor mobility to
analyze convergence of growth rates among regions within a nation state (the
They recognize that this framework is unrealistic for
states of the USA).
countries and especially for the U.S. states and note that extensions of the
neoclassical growth model that allow for features of an open economy tend to
speed up the predicted rate of convergence.
4 Two-country exogenous growth models with a Samuelson [1958]-Diamond
[1965] OLG household sector include Buiter [1981] and Buiter and Kletzer
(1990, 1991a]. Two-country exogenous growth models with a Yaari-Blanchard
uncertain lifetimes OLG household sector include Frenkel and Razin (1987] and
Buiter [1989]. A very simple two-country endogenous growth model with the
Samuelson-Diamond OLG household sector is developed in Buiter and Kletzer
[1991b]. A two-country endogenous growth model with the Yaari-Blanchard OLG
household sector is studied by Alogoskoufis and van der Ploeg [1991]. Closed
economy endogenous growth models with a Samuelson~Diamond OLG household sector
have been developed by Azariadis and Drazen [1990] and by Jones and Manuelli
[1990b]; the Yaari-Blanchard version has been studied by Alogoskoufis and van
der Ploeg [1990a,b].
5 other papers analyzing the consequences of the use of distortionary

taxes in (closed) endogenous growth models with a representative agent
household sector are Rebelo [1990], King and Rebelo [1990] and Barro and Sala
i Martin [1990a]. The latter also consider productive public spending. Jones
and Manuelli [1990a] analyze an infinite-lived representative agent version
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of the open economy endogenous growth model with distortionary taxes.
6 rn general, non-decreasing returns in both production processes is
necessary for endogenous growth.
7we were not aware of the contribution of Azariadis and Drazen
(henceforth A&D) when the first version of this paper was written. The focus
of the A&D paper is quite different from ours. Using a model of a closed
economy, they emphasize nonconvexities in the production and accumulation of
human capital as a source of possible multiple locally stable stationary
equilibria. When there are no traded inputs in the human capital production
technology, our specification of the human capital accumulation technology can
be written as follows:
1
1 1
n > 0.
ht/ht-1 = 1 + net/ht-1
A special but informative case of the human capital accumulation
technology of A&D (given in their equation (13b)) can, using our notation, be
written as
where; is an increasing function of
1
with a finite upper bound. The non-convexity in the human capital
t-1
production function of A&D can generate "threshold externalities" (radical
differences in dynamic behavior arising from local variations in social
returns to scale). Multiple steady states with significantly different levels
of education and training can be associated with small differences in initial
conditions, giving rise to "development traps".
Our constant returns to scale production function of human capital rules
out this particular source of multiplicity of steady states. Like any Diamond
OLG mode, however, our model may well possess multiple stationary equilibria
for the global economy. We do not study the behavior of the aggregate global
economy but instead focus on permanent differences between the growth rates of
labor productivity of the two countries that make up the global economy.
These can occur, in or out of steady state, despite the assumption of
identical, constant returns technologies and despite the equalization of the
ratio of physical to human capital brought about by perfect international
mobility of financial capital and the absence of source-based capital income
taxation.
h

BNote that unless, through vigorous intermarriage a la Bernheim and
Bagwell [1988], all of society effectively constitutes one big happy family,
the human capital formation externality, whose domain is both
intergenerational and across families or dynasties, will not be fully
internalized even if one assumed universal operative intergenerational gift
motives.
2
1
0
9Each household of each generation t takes wt+l' rt+l' rt+ 2 , h t , Tt, rt,

0t+l' 0t+ 2 , ~t+l and gt as given.
10u(.) and v(.) are increasing, strictly quasi-concave, twice
continuously differentiable and satisfy the Inada conditions
> 0.
lim u(x) = lim v(x) = 1/lim u(x) = 1/lim v(x) = 0;
x-+O
x-+O
x--+w
x--+w

P

1 1Assuming imperfect substitutability between m and g would result in
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additiona l tedious algebra, but would not qualitati vely change the effects of
g on human capital formation and private financial saving, as long as an
increase in g does not reduce the marginal products of education and private
traded inputs.
12
Recent empirical evidence that capital market imperfect ions constrain
individua ls' education al attainmen ts is given by Behrman, Kletzer, McPherson
and Schapiro [1992] and by Cameron and Heckman [1992], who find that family
financial resources are a significa nt determina nt of education levels.
13 see Buiter and Kletzer [1992] for an analysis of the condition s under
which the conventio nal governmen t solvency constrain t (22a) is implied by more
robust notions of feasibili ty of governmen t tax, spending and financing plans.
14 For a steady state to exist, preferenc es must be homothet ic.
15 When the constrain t mt~ 0 binds, the value of the marginal product of
traded inputs in the human capital accumulat ion process is below the after-tax
rate of interest (l+f'(kt+ 1 )-0 t+l -~ t+ 1 > wt+1 ~ 2 ). Equation (36) is dropped
and mt= 0 in this case.
16To achieve an equilibriu m for this 2-country economy that is Pareto
efficient , the two governme nts are required to subsidize human capital
formation in order to internali ze the externali ty and to forswear the use of
They also should refrain from choosing values of their
distortio nary taxes.
human capital accumula tion inputs g and g

* that make the constrain ts m

~ 0 or

m* ~ 0 binding. In addition one of the governmen ts may have to use lump-sum
taxes and transfers to ensure dynamic efficienc y. The first-bes t policy to
internali ze the externali ty is to subsidize time spent by the young in
education , et. In our model such an education subsidy is equivalen t either to
a subsidy on the wage earned by the middle aged or to a tax on leisure.
If in our model we also permitted the young to work (in addition to
choosing between leisure and education ), and if work did not produce a human
capital externali ty, then the equivalen ce between a subsidy to education , a
tax on leisure and a wage subsidy to the middle-ag ed would break down.
Efficienc y would then require a subsidy to education or a tax both on leisure
and on time spent working while young. The equivalen ce between an education
subsidy and a tax on leisure would also breaks down when the middle-ag ed can
choose leisure, unless age discrimin ation can be built into the leisure tax.
A subsidy to borrowing by the young for education al expenditu res is not needed
If a tax on leisure or a wage subsidy are not feasible,
in the first best.
then subsidizi ng student loans will be a second-be st policy. Subsidizi ng
private borrowing in general will be next best.
17It is easy to consider the differenc e made by the existence of national
in
in the home country and
source-ba sed taxation (say at a constant rate
national
of
instead
capital
from
income
rental
the
of
the foreign country)
Student
residence -based taxation of the income from all non-human wealth.
onal
internati
free
With
y.
simplicit
for
loan subsidies are also omitted
rates of
after-tax
of
ion
equalizat
have
now
we
mobility of financial capital
*
~*
~
*
return to physical capital, that is rt= rt= (1-Vt)f'( kt) = (1-Vt)f'( kt).

O

0*
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With source-based capital taxation, perfect capital mobility and a common
technology, the home country wage rate will be above the foreign wage rate if

Ao* • Even if all other private and policy parameters
~
and only if U is below
are identical, different wage rates will be associated with different
productivity growth rates. A higher wage rate during middle age increases the
rate of return to education. Unless the income effect of a higher wage on the
demand for leisure is very strong, the country with the higher real wage will
have the higher growth rate of productivity.
18 If the preference ordering generating Ut defined in equation (1) is
homothetic, it follows that
l
{)
2
2
1
2
2
/3 u(ct) + /3u(ct) + v(lt) = A[/3 u(ct/A) + u(ct/A) + v(lt/A)) for all

A>

O.

- 19 The steady-state effects of a change in Oare the same as the impact
effects of equal changes in ot+l and ot+2 •

20in the framework of this paper, any consequences of lump-sum financing
of ,say, increased home country public spending on education would affect
domestic and foreign interest rates and wage rates equally. This would
therefore not alter productivity growth differentials.
21 In period t the government can only change r!_ , the tax on the middle
1
2
aged, and rt_ , the tax on the old. Period t human capital formation is
2
performed by the young in that period, that is by generation t. Human capital
formation in period twill only be a function of expectations at time t

2
1 an d rt.
.
rt
concerning

The behavior of members of generation t during period t

is therefore only affected by tax changes in period t to the extent that such
and r!_ carry announcement effects concerning r! and r!, the
2
1
taxes they will pay when middle-aged and old. Of course, if the changes in
changes in r!_

r!_

1

and

r!_ 2

are news with respect to the information set of period t-1, then

the saving behavior of the middle-aged in period twill be affected. The
scope for time-inconsiste nt policy behavior in a model like ours is clearly
considerable. For reasons of space these issues will not be considered
further.
22 While the competitive equilibria of OLG models such as the one we are
considering may be dynamically inefficient, we shall consider the consequences
of a cut in lump-sum taxes during period t when the interest rate is above the
growth rate of physical capital in each period, which is sufficient for
dynamic efficiency in our non-stochastic model. Any government, acting
unilaterally, could issue debt or vary lump-sum taxation to achieve a national
Pareto improvement if dynamic inefficiency prevailed (see Buiter and Kletzer
[1990a, 1990b]). In steady state, the growth rate of physical capital equals
the growth rate of population, n, plus the growth rate of per capita human
If the interest rate
capital. The latter is non-negative in our model.
capital it therefore
human
aggregate
of
rate
growth
steady-state
the
exceeds
n.
also exceeds
2 3 This does not require the interest rate to be above the population
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growth rate.
24rf the government could also levy lump-sum taxes on the young, there
would not be any loss of generality in restricting ourselves to balanced
budget redistribut ion schemes. See Buiter and Kletzer [1992].
25 In the self-financ ing constraint interpretat ion of our model, financial
markets are clearly imperfect. The inability to borrow in order to finance
education and training, however, excludes the young equally from the domestic
and from the internation al financial markets.

